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RUNAWAY GUARANTORS:
REEVALUATING THE SCOPE OF
THE SHAM GUARANTY DEFENSE
Ndidi Onyebuchukwu*
Guarantors are responsible to lenders for the debts that they guarantee.
Unfortunately, some guarantors try to avoid this responsibility by
asserting the sham guaranty defense, a defense with poorly defined
criteria and an inconstant application. The current lack of clarity
surrounding the sham guaranty defense has rendered it susceptible to
abuse by runaway guarantors and left lenders uncertain about how to
best structure their commercial real estate loan transactions. Against
this backdrop, this Note surveys the current state of the sham guarantee
defense in California, focusing both on the historical development of the
defense and the common factual scenarios in which it is asserted. Next,
this Note explores how the California courts’ uneven treatment of the
defense has resulted in confusion, unfair results, and an expansion of
the defense that favors guarantors. Finally, this Note argues that the
California Legislature should intervene and provide guidance to the
courts about the proper scope of the sham guaranty defense. To assist
in this effort, this Note offers proposed statute that legislators and other
interested parties may consider in their attempts to provide some muchneeded stability to this area of commercial lending law.

* J.D., May 2013, Loyola Law School Los Angeles; B.S., May 2009, California State
University, Dominguez Hills. Thanks to Professor Dan Schechter for his extraordinary patience
and wealth of knowledge about California guarantor law, which he graciously and ever so
patiently shared with me. Also, thanks to the 2011–2012 Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Note
and Comment Editors for their valuable advice. Finally, special thanks to my family for their
support throughout this process. Their constant advice and understanding made it all worthwhile
in the end.
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“While you may not think it’s true . . .
creditors are people too.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
Until recently, lenders had little to worry about when they
approved a loan that was partly based on the assurance of a
guarantor. Guaranties used to be a routine part of these loan
transactions. However, “[i]n the current economic climate,
guarantors and lenders are taking a closer look at their guaranty
agreements.”2 Nowhere is this more prevalent than in the area of
commercial real estate loans secured by real property.3
A surety or guarantor can be defined as one who “promises to
answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another, or
hypothecates property as security.”4 Conceptually, a guaranty is
simply “a promise to pay the debt of another.”5 But courts have not
historically favored guaranties, and guarantors have successfully
asserted several defenses to avoid accountability for the loans they
freely guaranteed.6
Further, courts have historically shown a great deal of concern
for guarantors, “exonerating them from their obligations
whenever . . . [borrowers and lenders] change[d] the contract without
the guarantor’s consent.”7 The courts’ concern likely stemmed from
their effort to understand what, exactly, the guarantors agreed to
1. Debt Negotiation, NATIONWIDE DEBT SETTLEMENT GROUP, http://www.nationwidedebt
settlementgroup.net/debt-negotiation.php (last visited Aug. 6, 2012).
2. Stephen Peterson et al., Enforcing Commercial Real Estate Loan Guaranties, GA. B. J.,
Oct. 2009, at 12, 18.
3. See id.; see generally Carl D. Ciochon, Guarantor Liability—A Litigation Perspective,
WENDEL
ROSEN
(Fall
2008),
http://www.wendel.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=
content.contentDetail&ID=9018 (summarizing a California law governing guaranties in real
estate secured transactions); Charles S. Ferrel & Jeffery S. Thieve, Time to Think About Your
Real Estate Loan Guaranty, FEAGRE BAKER DANIELS (Mar. 5, 2009), http://www.faegrebd.com/
9026 (discussing guaranty laws in the commercial real estate context).
4. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2787–2788 (West 2008). However, the California legislature
abolished the distinction between surety and guarantor in 1939. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 2787.
5. John R. Ruhr, Enforcing Commercial Guaranties in and out of Bankruptcy Court, RYAN
SWANSON LAW 1, 1 (Mar. 23, 2011), available at http://www.ryanswansonlaw.com/attorneys/
documents/Ruhl-EnforcingGuaranties.pdf.
6. Id.
7. Roy S. Geiger & Michael A. Allen, Fool with a Pen: The Use of Single Purpose Entities
in Real Estate Loans Has Raised New Issues for Lenders and Guarantors Alike, L.A. LAW.,
Jan. 2006, at 35, available at http://www.lacba.org/Files/LAL/Vol28No11/2215.pdf.
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answer for when they signed guaranty agreements.8 Nonetheless,
despite guaranties’ unpopularity with courts, they serve a useful
purpose in commercial loan transactions. By allowing the
guarantor’s financial strength to enhance the creditworthiness of the
borrower, guaranties enable borrowers to gain access to credit that
might otherwise remain out of reach.9
Unfortunately, guaranty enforcement is not as easy as guaranty
creation. In fact, enforcement has become more difficult in the
current U.S. economic environment.10 It is more difficult still in
California, where the real estate crisis, which began in 2007, remains
severe.11 “[F]ew people foresaw the historically significant economic
storms of the recent past or the negative effect they would have on
the [borrower’s] financial strength.”12 Needless to say, much has
changed over the past few years due to these negative effects.13
Today, as the number of foreclosures continues to increase, property
values have declined below the levels lenders anticipated when they
initiated the loan transactions.14
These changes in the real estate landscape have increased
lenders’ desire to foreclose quickly, before property values
depreciate further.15 However, in California, unlike other states, the
choice of foreclosure substantially affects the rights of all parties
involved in the transaction.16 A lender has two options for
foreclosing on a property. The first option gives the lender the right

8. Id.
9. Ruhr, supra note 5, at 1.
10. John W. Easterbrook, Enforcing Loan Guarantees in an Anemic Economy: Beware of
the Sham, SILICON VALLEY L. GRP., http://www.svlg.com/downloadpage.php?fuseaction=
content.contentDetail&id=8871&lid=0 (last visited Apr. 3, 2012).
11. Although this problem is prevalent in all parts of the country, this Note focuses on the
issue in California.
12. Easterbrook, supra note 10.
13. Id.
14. Eric J. Rans & David J. Williams, A Lender’s Guide for Avoiding Sham Guaranty
Claims—The Devil Is in the Details, 128 BANKING L.J. 483, 486 (2011).
15. Id.
16. In many states, the law does not prohibit a lender from getting a deficiency judgment
from a borrower following a nonjudicial foreclosure. See State Limits on Deficiency Judgments,
FORECLOSUREFISH (Feb. 25, 2010), http://www.foreclosurefish.com/blog/index.php?id=994.
These states include Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, and Maryland. All of these
states allow some form of deficiency judgment after a nonjudicial foreclosure. Id. This is a sharp
contrast to California, where, by conducting a nonjudicial foreclosure, the lender is prohibited
from obtaining any deficiency amounts from the borrower. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580d
(West 2008). For a definition of a “deficiency judgment,” see infra note 20.
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to proceed through a judicial foreclosure, which is “often a lengthy
process carried out through the court after . . . [the creditor has]
obtain[ed] a judgment against the debtor.”17
The second option is for the lender to proceed through a
nonjudicial foreclosure sale of the collateral real property. 18 This is
usually a “shorter, less formal, generally less expensive and simpler
process.”19 Regardless of the type of foreclosure the lender conducts,
“what if, after foreclosing on the borrower’s real property, a
deficiency [sum] is still left owed to the lender[?]”20 For example, if
a lender loans $8 million to a borrower, but the sale of the property
recoups only $5 million, the lender is left $3 million short.21
The legal consequences of the above situation depend on the
form of foreclosure that the lender decides to take. If a lender
pursues judicial foreclosure, it will be able to recoup the $3 million
owed after the sale from the borrower.22 But if it proceeds through a
nonjudicial foreclosure, there are laws that restrict the lender’s
actions against the borrower.23 Statutes—called “antideficiency
statutes”—protect the borrower by preventing the lender from
obtaining a judgment for any deficiency still owed after the
nonjudicial foreclosure.24 Borrowers cannot waive these protections,
which are inapplicable to guarantors.25
A guarantor is not completely without rights. In California, a
guarantor enjoys two rights against a primary borrower, one direct
and the other derivative.26 First, guarantors have a direct right of
reimbursement against the borrower for any amounts it paid to the
lender on behalf of the borrower.27 Second, guarantors enjoy a

17. Rans & Williams, supra note 14, at 484.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. “A deficiency judgment is an unsecured money judgment against a borrower whose
mortgage foreclosure sale did not produce sufficient funds to pay the underlying promissory note,
or loan, in full.” Jason Poland, Deficiency Judgments—Do the Banks Really Sue Homeowners?
COLUMBUS REAL EST. NEWS, http://columbusrealestatenews.featuredblog.com/deficiencyjudgments-do-the-banks-really-sue-homeowners/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2012).
21. Rans & Williams, supra note 14, at 484.
22. Id.
23. Rans & Williams, supra note 14, at 484; see CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE. §§ 580a, 580b,
580d, 726 (West 2008).
24. Rans & Williams, supra note 14, at 485.
25. Id.
26. Geiger & Allen, supra note 7, at 36.
27. Id.
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derivative right known as subrogation in which they stand in the
position of the lender and assert the lender’s right against the
borrower.28 Unlike the borrower’s unwaivable statutory protections,
a guarantor’s rights may be voluntarily waived.29
These factors—the rise in foreclosures, antideficiency
protections for borrowers, declining property values, and guarantors’
waivable rights—have all increased lenders’ incentives to pursue
guarantors after judicial or nonjudicial foreclosure sales, in order to
recoup remaining amounts.30 Unfortunately for lenders, when they
call guarantors to answer for loans that the guarantors freely
guaranteed, the guarantors often artfully claim defenses to avoid
accountability.31 The most prominent is the “sham guaranty”
defense, which stems from the principle that a borrower cannot
guarantee his or her own debt.32
As an illustration of this concept, assume the following facts.
Owen is a developer who seeks a loan from the Los Angeles
People’s Bank to finance the development of an apartment complex
in Los Angeles. The bank reviews Owen’s financial standing and is
satisfied. However, the bank informs Owen that to qualify for the
loan, he must create a new company that will be used as the primary
borrower. In addition, Owen would also guarantee the obligation of
the new company he created. At the bank’s urging, Owen creates the
new company, which becomes the primary borrower, and guarantees
the loan. Under these facts, many, if not all, courts will find Owen’s
guaranty a sham guaranty, which renders it unenforceable. The legal
basis behind this argument is that the guarantor is the de facto
borrower and cannot guarantee his own debt. 33 If a court finds that a
guaranty is a “sham,” the guarantor will be treated as the real
borrower. Consequently, the guarantor will be protected by the antideficiency statutes, and he or she will be unable to waive the

28. Id.
29. Rans & Williams, supra note 14, at 483. For a discussion of how guarantors waive their
rights, see infra Part II.A.
30. See Rans & Williams, supra note 14, at 486.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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protections.34 Thus, a guarantor who succeeds on a sham guaranty
defense is exonerated from further liability to the lender.
Even though the finding of a sham guaranty has far-reaching
consequences for the lender, California has not defined what
constitutes a sham guaranty through either statutory or case law.35 As
a result, courts often consider a broad variety of factors, including
but not limited to (1) whether the principal obligor, if it is a
corporation, was created for the sole purpose of entering into the
underlying loan; (2) whether the lender inquired about the
borrower’s financial status or merely relied on the guarantor’s
financial statements; and (3) whether the purpose of the loan
agreements was to avoid the antideficiency statutes.36 While courts
generally balance these factors, they have done so inconsistently.37
Not surprisingly, such inconsistencies have resulted in conflicting
holdings in factually similar cases, and confusion for lenders.38
The lack of clarity and the inconsistency in this area of law have
left lenders unsure of whether a guarantor may escape its obligation
under a commercial real estate loan transaction by invoking the sham
guaranty defense. Part II.A of this Note includes a brief overview of
guarantors’ statutory rights in California. It also examines the history
of enforceable waivers through which guarantors voluntarily waive
their statutory rights, thus paving the way for lenders to recoup their
losses following a nonjudicial foreclosure. Part II.B discusses the

34. Maxwell M. Freeman & Elizabeth Freeman Guryev, An Overview of Defenses Available
to Guarantors of Real Property Secured Transactions Under California Law, 38 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 329, 344 (1998) (footnote omitted).
35. Paradise Land & Cattle Co. v. McWilliams Enters., 959 F.2d 1463, 1467 (9th Cir. 1992)
(“California law does not define ‘sham’ guaranties.”).
36. Robert M. Heller, You’re Exonerated: Exploring the “Sham Guaranty” Defense to
Eliminate Liability Under a Guaranty, BIG NEWS FOR SMALLER FIRMS, Apr./May 2010, at 16,
17, available at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=97418d7f-dd6c-4dd083e6-b78357911101 (citing considerations explored in Torrey Pines Bank v. Hoffman, 282 Cal.
Rptr. 354, 361 (Ct. App. 1991)).
37. See, e.g., Paradise, 959 F.2d at 1468 (finding no sham guaranty problem because the
creditor did not request that Enterprises—the guarantor—should be removed as the primary
borrower and instead guaranty the loan); Talbott v. Hustwit, 78 Cal. Rptr. 3d 703, 707 (Ct. App.
2008) (finding that the guarantors failed in their attempt to invoke the sham guaranty defense
because they created a limited liability company to separate themselves from the obligation of the
primary borrower); River Bank Am. v. Diller, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 790, 802 (Ct. App. 1995) (finding
a sham guaranty because the creditor used a preexisting entity—which was created by the
guarantor—as the primary borrower); Valinda Builders, Inc. v. Bissner, 40 Cal. Rptr. 735, 738
(Ct. App. 1964).
38. See supra note 37.
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history of the sham guaranty defense, which is a last refuge for a
guarantor who has waived his or her rights, and it examines common
scenarios where guarantors have successfully or unsuccessfully
asserted the defense.
Part III illustrates the inconsistent application of the sham
guaranty defense, which has resulted in confusion, unfair results, and
an expansion of the defense that favors guarantors. Complicating this
landscape is the California appellate court’s recent decision in
Talbott v. Hustwit.39 Part IV proposes a legislative solution to the
problem. Given the uncertainty surrounding the factual predicate for
this defense, the legislature should expressly define its scope by
outlining factors for courts to consider, designating the appropriate
weight to accord to each factor, and delineating certain parameters
that the courts should adhere to in applying the defense.
II. STATEMENT OF EXISTING LAW
A. Historical Perspective on
Guarantors’ Statutory Rights
and Waivers in California
In California commercial real estate transactions where real
property is used as security for debt, the borrower executes a deed of
trust in favor of the lender, and the lender receives a promissory note
from the borrower as evidence of the debt owed.40 If the borrower
defaults on the promissory note, the lender has the option to
foreclose on the secured property to recoup its loss.41 These
transactions usually involve a personal guaranty of the obligation.
Although the basic purpose of the guaranty is clear, “there can
be no absolute assurance that every guaranty will be fully
enforceable in [all] situation[s].”42 Thus, to protect their rights,
lenders try to understand the guarantor’s and borrower’s rights under
the applicable laws.43 Specifically, in California guarantors have
statutory rights that make it difficult to enforce a guaranty. Among
other things, statutes provide that the obligation of a guarantor “must

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

78 Cal. Rptr. 3d 703 (Ct. App. 2008).
Rans & Williams, supra note 14, at 484.
Id.
Ruhr, supra note 5, at 8.
Id.

Summer 2012]

RUNAWAY GUARANTORS

1399

be neither larger in amount nor in other respects more burdensome
than that of the principal”;44 that the guarantor is exonerated if the
creditor alters the principal’s original obligation without the
guarantor’s consent or if the creditor’s remedies or rights against the
principal are impaired;45 and that the guarantor may require the
creditor “to proceed against the principal, or to pursue any other
remedy in the creditor’s power which the [guarantor] cannot
pursue.”46
While a guarantor may voluntarily waive all of the above
rights,47 it was not always clear to lenders what language would
render their waivers valid and effective. This problem was apparent
in the landmark case of Union Bank v. Gradsky.48 In Gradsky, a bank
approved a construction loan that was secured by the real property of
the primary borrower.49 The contractor for the project, Max Gradsky,
personally guaranteed the loan, which included a general waiver.50
Subsequently, the primary borrower defaulted on the construction
loan; the lender sold the real property through a nonjudicial
foreclosure sale and sought to collect the remaining loan balance
from Gradsky.51
The court decided that because the bank pursued a remedy that
“destroy[ed] both the security and the possibility of [Gradsky’s]
reimbursement from the principal debtor,” it could not pursue
Gradsky for a deficiency following the nonjudicial foreclosure sale.52
By conducting a nonjudicial sale of the property, the bank
44. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2809 (West 2008).
45. Id. § 2819.
46. Id. § 2845. California law provides guarantors with a number of additional statutory
protections. See, e.g., id. § 2847 (stating that a guarantor who satisfies the principal obligation is
entitled to reimbursement from the principal); id. § 2848 (“[A guarantor], upon satisfying the
obligation of the principal, is entitled to enforce every remedy which the creditor then has against
the principal to the extent of reimbursing what he has expended . . . .”); Union Bank v. Gradsky,
71 Cal. Rptr. 64 (Ct. App. 1968) (holding that if a lender nonjudicially forecloses upon real
property securing the debt—and thereby loses the right to a deficiency judgment under the
California antideficiency laws—the lender is estopped from proceeding against the guarantor
because the lender has destroyed the guarantor’s rights of subrogation and reimbursement).
47. Rans & Williams, supra note 14, at 485.
48. 71 Cal. Rptr. 64 (Ct. App. 1968).
49. Id. at 65–66.
50. Id. at 66.
51. Id. Recall from Part I that a lender cannot collect any deficiency amount from the
primary borrower after conducting a nonjudicial foreclosure, so the lender instead pursues the
guarantor.
52. Id. at 69.
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irreparably damaged Gradsky’s postsubrogation rights under
Sections 2848 and 2849 of the California Civil Code.53 Furthermore,
Section 580d of the California Code of Civil Procedure prohibits a
creditor and his assigns from further debt collection after a
nonjudicial sale.54 Although Section 580d only protects the primary
borrower, through its operation, the bank’s nonjudicial sale of the
real-property security “fully destroy[ed] the future rights of any
creditor, including the subrogated Gradsky. In light of these
considerations, the court ruled in Gradsky’s favor.”55 After Gradsky,
lenders began to draft documents that not only contained general
waivers but also specific waivers of subrogation rights.56
Lenders soon began using Gradsky waivers in an attempt to
ensure that nonjudicial sales would not impair their ability to collect
any remaining debt from a guarantor.57 Subsequently, the court in
Cathay Bank v. Lee58 placed strict requirements on the validity of
Gradsky waivers.59 Cathay Bank was later superseded by Section
2856 of the California Civil Code, which relaxed these requirements
and permitted guarantors to waive their Gradsky defenses.60 Through
the statute, the California legislature finally clarified the validity and
effectiveness of waivers. Following the legislature’s intervention, it
appeared that lenders could finally be assured that, if they conducted

53. See David E. Hackett, Note, Guaranteed Confusion: The Uncertain Validity of
Suretyship Defense Waivers in California, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1097, 1103 (2008).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1104.
56. Id. These waivers are called “Gradsky Waivers” after this landmark case.
57. Id.
58. 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 420 (Ct. App. 1993). In Cathay Bank, a bank loaned money to a
corporate debtor, securing the principal obligation with both real property and a personal
guaranty—with Gradsky waivers—from one of the corporation’s directors. Id. at 420–21. The
corporation defaulted on its obligation, and the lender conducted a nonjudicial foreclosure and
obtained summary judgment against the guarantor for the balance of the loan. Id. at 420. The
court exonerated the guarantor, stating that the waiver “does nothing to tell the guarantor that the
very fact of the loss of those subrogation rights itself has legal significance—namely that it
confers an immunity from a deficiency judgment.” Id. at 423.
59. WRI Opportunity Loans II LLC v. Cooper, 65 Cal. Rptr. 3d 205, 221 (Ct. App. 2007)
(noting that the Cathay court “imposed stringent requirements on a guarantor's waiver of a
defense arising from the principal's rights under the antideficiency statutes”).
60. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2856 (West 2008); see also Cooper, 65 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 221 (“Civil
Code section 2856 was the Legislature's response to Cathay Bank . . . .”). Under this section,
guarantors are “expressly permitted to waive the Gradsky defense and all common law rights and
defenses.” Hackett, supra note 53, at 1107. California lawmakers enacted this legislation in
response to lenders’ concerns that “it would be impossible to draft reliable [guaranty] documents
with no clear guidance on future judicial review and intervention.” Id. at 1106–07.
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a nonjudicial foreclosure, they could still recoup any remaining
amounts from guarantors who waived their rights.61 Unfortunately,
the expansive but inconsistent use of the sham guaranty continues to
confuse lenders when structuring a transaction.
B. Historical Perspective of
the Sham Guaranty Defense
A guarantor, it has been said, is a “fool with a pen.”62 As such,
courts indulge guarantors by creating several equitable defenses.63
Guarantors routinely and voluntarily waive these defenses.64 As a
result, waivers clear the way for lenders to recoup their losses from
guarantors regardless of the form of foreclosure that the lenders
pursue.65 When the waivers are deemed to be valid and effective,
guarantors next turn to another avenue to avoid their obligations: the
sham guaranty defense. 66
It is indeed a convenient avenue because this area of law is
sorely lacking in legislative and judicial guidance.67 Each case that
has found a sham guaranty has been fact-sensitive.68 With no clear
law to guide them in adjudicating this issue, courts rely on weighing
several factors including: (1) whether the lender was directing the
structure of the transaction;69 (2) whether the lender engineered a
change in the borrowing entity and then required the initially
proposed borrower, usually the sole shareholder, to execute a

61. See Hackett, supra note 53, at 1106–08.
62. MARK A. SENN, COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE LEASES: PREPARATION, NEGOTIATION,
AND FORMS 28-18 (3d ed. 2004).
63. Id.
64. Transactional lawyers who draft guaranties will usually include contractual Gradsky
waivers in the agreements that guarantors eventually endorse. Julia M. Wei, Guaranty,
Guarantee, Potato, Potahto . . ., DIRTBLAWG (Nov. 26, 2008), http://dirtblawg.com/2008/11/
guaranty-guarantee-potato-potahto.html.
65. With valid waivers in place, the effect is that creditors can pursue guarantors for any
remaining amounts after the foreclosure sale of the security, even if they have destroyed the
guarantors’ subrogation rights. See Hackett, supra note 53, at 1097.
66. See Rans & Williams, supra note 14, at 485–86.
67. See supra notes 35–39 and accompanying text.
68. See Paradise Land & Cattle Co. v. McWilliams Enters., 959 F.2d 1463, 1467–68 (9th
Cir. 1992); Talbott v. Hustwit, 78 Cal. Rptr. 3d 703 (Ct. App. 2008); Cadle Co. II v. Harvey, 100
Cal. Rptr. 2d 150 (Ct. App. 2000); River Bank Am. v. Diller, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 790 (Ct. App.
1995); Torrey Pines Bank v. Hoffman, 282 Cal. Rptr. 354 (Ct. App. 1991); Valinda Builders, Inc.
v. Bissner, 40 Cal. Rptr. 735 (Ct. App. 1964).
69. See Valinda Builders, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 738.
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guaranty;70 (3) whether the guarantor is the alter ego of the
borrower;71 (4) whether the lender reviewed the guarantor’s financial
information in approving the loan rather than relying on the
borrower’s;72 (5) whether the lender demanded that the guarantor add
additional collateral to the transaction;73 and (6) whether the lender
first sought to secure liens on the guarantor’s personal property.74
These factual inquiries have grown rather broad, giving lenders little
guidance when structuring loan transactions involving personal
guaranties.
Most of the earlier sham guaranty cases focused mainly on the
fact that the guarantor was merely an alter ego of the primary
borrower—that the primary borrower, if an entity, was a shell entity,
created solely for the transaction.75 One such case was Valinda
Builders, Inc. v. Bissner.76 There, two men agreed to purchase
acreage that would then be subdivided into building lots. 77 In the
agreement, the purchasers guaranteed payment of the purchase price
and other obligations related to the ultimate development.78 When
escrow was ready to close, the purchasers had title vest in a newly
organized corporation that executed the promissory note.79
When the project failed, the lender sued the guarantors on their
personal guaranty of the loan.80 The court found that the corporation
was a shell corporation that was created at the request of the lender
solely for conducting the transaction.81 The court reasoned that the

70. See Mark Mengelberg & Anthony Burney, Proceed with Caution: Enforcing a Defaulted
Loan Within the Framework of California’s One Action Rule, REAL EST. FIN. REP., Spring 2008,
at 1, 7–8, available at http://www.seyfarth.com/dir_docs/news_item/510fdaf1-8048-421b-9f08089a643be9c4_documentupload.pdf.
71. See Riddle v. Lashing, 21 Cal. Rptr. 902, 903 (Ct. App. 1962); infra note 75 and
accompanying text.
72. See Diller, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 790, 802–03.
73. Heller, supra note 36, at 17.
74. Id.
75. Cadle Co. II v. Harvey, 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 150, 154 (Ct. App. 2000); Torrey Pines Bank
v. Hoffman, 282 Cal. Rptr. 354, 360–61 (Ct. App. 1991); Valinda Builders, Inc. v. Bissner, 40
Cal. Rptr. 735, 738 (Ct. App. 1964).
76. 40 Cal. Rptr. 735 (Ct. App. 1964).
77. Id. at 735–36.
78. Id. at 736–37.
79. Id. at 736.
80. Id. at 736–37.
81. Id. at 737 (“There was no evidence that [the company] was anything other than an
instrumentality used by the individuals or that defendants were ever removed from their status
and obligations of purchasers.”).
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purported guarantors were already liable for the debt as primary
obligors and that the lenders could not recoup any additional
amounts from them.82 The court thus exonerated the guarantors.
A subsequent case addressed a scenario in which the guarantor
was purportedly the alter ego of the primary borrower. In Torrey
Pines Bank v. Hoffman,83 the plaintiff made a construction loan to an
inter vivos trust that the trustees (and settlors) personally guaranteed,
and appropriate waivers were inserted in the guaranty agreement.84
After the primary borrower (the inter vivos trust) defaulted, the
lender conducted a nonjudicial foreclosure but recouped less than the
debt.85 The lender subsequently sued the guarantors for the
remaining amount.86 The court denied any recovery to the lender on
the basis that the borrower and the guarantor were in fact the same.87
A similar case was Cadle Co. II v. Harvey.88 The Harvey Family
Trust purchased real property from a bank and gave it a note secured
by a deed of trust on the property.89 Mr. Harvey, the settlor and
trustee of the trust, signed a personal guaranty.90 The trust defaulted
on the loan, and the bank conducted a nonjudicial foreclosure.91
Since the bank recouped less than the amount borrowed, it sued the
guarantor to collect the balance.92 Under these facts, the court found
that the guaranty was a sham since Mr. Harvey, as trustee, was the
primary obligor on the note.93
Courts deal with a different and more complex scenario when an
individual unilaterally creates an entity prior to a transaction, uses
that entity as the primary borrower or guarantor of a loan, and
subsequently guarantees the debt.94 Since the guarantor was not
induced to create this new entity, the question then becomes whether

82. See id. at 739.
83. 282 Cal. Rptr. 354 (Ct. App. 1991).
84. Id. at 356–57.
85. Id. at 358.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 359.
88. 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 150 (Ct. App. 2000).
89. Id. at 153.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 153–54.
94. See Paradise Land & Cattle Co. v. McWilliams Enters., 959 F.2d 1463 (9th Cir. 1992);
River Bank Am. v. Diller, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 790 (Ct. App. 1995).
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it is proper to allow him or her to later assert a sham guaranty
defense.95
The holdings in cases involving this factual scenario have been
inconsistent at best. An older case that addressed a similar fact
pattern was Paradise Land & Cattle Co. v. McWilliams Enterprises,
Inc.96 The McWilliamses were ranchers who owned and operated
their business through Enterprises, a corporation that father and son
had formed together prior to their attempts to secure a loan.97 The
McWilliamses controlled Enterprises and were its only
shareholders.98 In order to purchase another ranch, the McWilliamses
approached a bank seeking the loan necessary to finance the
purchase.99
To secure the loan, the McWilliamses served as the primary
borrowers and Enterprises purported to guarantee the debt on the
note.100 Subsequently, the McWilliamses defaulted on the loan and
the bank foreclosed on the security.101 The holder of the note then
sued Enterprises to recoup the remaining amounts, since Enterprises
had guaranteed the debt.102 Although Enterprises tried to assert the
sham guaranty defense, the court found that it was a true guarantor,
even though the McWilliamses were its sole shareholders.103 The
court reasoned that Enterprises was a viable entity that was not
created at the inducement of the lender.104 The court further rejected
the guarantor’s suggestion that the court adopt a “transactional
instrumentality” rule.105
However, two years after Paradise Land & Cattle Co., a court
addressed a similar fact pattern but came to a different conclusion.106
95. See Rans & Williams, supra note 14, at 489–91.
96. 959 F.2d 1463 (9th Cir. 1992).
97. Id. at 1465.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1467 (stating that the entity used as the guarantor was not a “dummy” company,
but rather had substantial assets, so the McWilliamses could not assert the sham guaranty
defense).
104. See id.
105. Id. at 1468. “According to this [‘transactional instrumentality’] rule, viable, non‘dummy’ corporations controlled by the purchaser-debtor and used by the latter as an
‘instrumentality’ for the purposes of the transaction should be considered the purchaser-debtor for
the purposes of section 580b.” Id.
106. Although Paradise Land & Cattle Co. was decided by a federal court while River Bank
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In River Bank America v. Diller,107 Sanford Diller, a real estate
developer, and his wife, Helen, were the trustees of a revocable
family trust that owned all of the stock in Prometheus Development
(“Prometheus”).108 Prometheus sought construction loans from River
Bank to complete an apartment complex.109
To protect its right to recover from a guarantor if the primary
borrower were to default, River Bank required that the primary
borrower could not be Prometheus since the Dillers—the prospective
guarantors if Prometheus was the primary borrower—were its only
shareholders and, as such, were not distinct from it.110
Coincidentally, the Dillers already owned a separate entity called
Prom XX, which they routinely used as a place marker in other
transactions.111 Further, Prom XX was not without any capital or
assets.112 The Dillers suggested using Prom XX as the primary
obligor in the transaction, with the Dillers guaranteeing the loan
personally.113
Prom XX defaulted on the loan and River Bank conducted a
nonjudicial foreclosure.114 Following the nonjudicial foreclosure,
River Bank sued the Dillers on their personal guaranty to recoup the
remaining amount.115 Based on these facts, the court held that “the
Dillers ha[d] raised a triable issue of fact concerning their ‘sham
guaranty’ defense.”116 The court made this decision although Prom
America was decided by a California court, Paradise Land & Cattle Co. was a diversity case in
which California law applied.
107. 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 790 (Ct. App. 1995).
108. Id. at 792. Although the guarantors made several other allegations against River Bank,
such as accusations of modification and duress, this Note focuses only on the sham guaranty
defense.
109. Id.
110. See id. at 802.
111. Id. at 801.
112. See id. The court mentioned that Prom XX did not have “substantial” assets or capital.
Id. This, however, does not foreclose the possibility that the entity held some assets and capital.
Courts have never delineated the amount of capital or assets that a company must have in these
situations. See Rans & Williams, supra note 14, at 488.
113. River Bank Am., 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 802.
114. Id. at 793.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 803. In finding for the Dillers, the court essentially adopted the transactional
instrumentality rule that the court in Paradise Land & Cattle Co. had rejected. See Paradise Land
& Cattle Co. v. McWilliams Enters., 959 F.2d 1463, 1468 (9th Cir. 1992). The River Bank
America court emphasized that the bank used Prom XX—a company previously created and used
as a place marker in other transactions by the Dillers—as the primary borrower. River Bank Am.,
45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 803.
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XX was already in existence at the time of the transaction, and the
lenders had not induced the Dillers to create the entity.117
Furthermore, in finding that there was a triable issue as to the
sham guaranty, the court also considered the Dillers’ assertion that
River Bank did not inquire into the financial standing of Prom XX,
the primary borrower, during the loan application process.118 Rather,
River Bank relied heavily upon the Dillers’ own financial
statements.119 Thus, the court concluded that since River Bank
looked at the financial standing of the guarantors rather than that of
the primary borrower, the guaranty was possibly a sham.120
Following the different outcomes in River Bank America and
Paradise Land & Cattle Co., the governing law of this factual
scenario became even more confusing for lenders. On the one hand,
lenders could be wary of situations in which individuals create an
entity prior to a transaction without the inducement of the lender, the
entity is used as the primary borrower in the transaction, the
individual subsequently signs a personal guaranty, or the entity is
used as a guarantor for the individual debt.
On the other hand, such facts were clearly present in Paradise
Land & Cattle Co., yet the court upheld the guaranty as a true
guaranty. Consequently, the present state of this area of law creates
several questions. What does the law require to find a sham guaranty
defense? How broad is the scope of this defense, and how can
lenders anticipate the defense when structuring their transactions
without clear law? Thus far, the answer to these questions remains
inconclusive.
III. CRITIQUE OF EXISTING LAW
An investigation of the legal standards, factors, and other
variables that are considered in the analysis of a sham guaranty
defense could confuse any lawyer not familiar with California real
property law.121 The problems that have plagued this area of law, and
continue to do so, “stem from the secondary results of what appears,
117. See River Bank Am., 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 803.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See id.
121. Andrew A. Bassak, Comment, Secured Transaction Guarantors in California: Is It Time
to Reevaluate the Validity and Timing of Waivers of Rights?, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 265, 265
(1992).
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at first blush, to be [the] application of sound legal principle[s].”122
However, upon closer examination, the California courts’ application
and interpretation of the many factors considered in finding a sham
guaranty—both those that can be contemplated at the time of
transaction and those that cannot—has resulted in “a spin-off of
confusion and inequity” in this area of the law.”123
Lenders are often left perplexed.124 How can they structure a
transactions in ways that would not run afoul of the sham guaranty
defense? Without any statutory or case law that clearly states the
rule, courts deciding the issue have been free to consider any number
of factors that they and guarantors’ attorneys choose. As such, it
becomes more difficult for lenders to prepare for foreclosure
proceedings against borrowers who default on loans.125 A recent
case, Talbott v. Hustwit,126 has done little to clarify this unsettled
area of law.
A. The Talbott v. Hustwit Decision:
A Return to Paradise Land & Cattle Co. or
a Temporary Departure from River Bank America?
Confusion regarding the laws that govern real estate loans
secured by real property is not entirely new.127 Analyzing whether
the guaranty is a “true” one is particularly important prior to the
lender taking any enforcement actions.128 However, due to the
confusion in this area, lenders are unable to effectively perform this
analysis before structuring transactions.129 Thus, the implications can
be disastrous for a lender who seeks to enforce a guaranty that is
later determined to be a sham.
The decision in Talbott v. Hustwit has made this issue even more
confusing for lenders. It is a case of a lawyer who outsmarted
himself. Hustwit and his wife were the settlors of a revocable trust

122. Id. at 286.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 266.
125. Id.
126. 78 Cal. Rptr. 3d 703 (Ct. App. 2008).
127. See Hackett, supra note 53 (discussing the confusion over the validity of waivers).
128. See, e.g., Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. Barton, 789 F. Supp. 1043 (C.D. Cal. 1992);
River Bank Am. v. Diller, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 790 (Ct. App. 1995); Torrey Pines Bank v. Hoffman,
282 Cal. Rptr. 354 (Ct. App. 1991); Union Bank v. Gradsky, 71 Cal. Rptr. 64, 68 (Ct. App. 1968).
129. Bassak, supra note 121, at 265.
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that owned real property.130 The trust borrowed money and the
Hustwits personally guaranteed the debt.131 Unlike the guarantors in
Cadle Co. II v. Harvey132 and Torrey Pines Bank v. Hoffman,133 who
were also the trustees of the borrower trust, the Hustwits unilaterally
formed a limited liability company to act as the trustee.134
The trust defaulted on the loan, and the bank foreclosed via a
nonjudicial foreclosure.135 Not surprisingly, the bank sued the
Hustwits to collect the loan balance, and the Hustwits asserted the
sham guaranty defense to avoid any obligation.136 The court held that
the Hustwits, by creating a separate entity that stood as the primary
borrower in their stead, became secondary obligors—i.e.,
guarantors.137
Thus, the appellate court held that the Hustwits were indeed real
guarantors.138 They were not trustees of the trust; instead, they had
unilaterally created a limited liability company as trustee, thereby
limiting their personal liability for the trust’s obligations.139 In fact,
“the Hustwits simply outwitted themselves.”140 By going through the
charade of creating an entity to stand in as the primary borrower,
they effectively separated themselves from the trust, and made
themselves true guarantors.141
The similarities between Paradise Land & Cattle Co., River
Bank America, and Talbott are clear. In all three cases, the following
facts were present: (1) the individual borrower formed a separate
entity prior to the creation of the underlying loan transaction; (2) the
owner unilaterally created an entity without the lender’s inducement;
(3) the individual borrower used the entity as the primary borrower
130. Talbott, 78 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 704, 707.
131. Id. at 704–05.
132. See supra notes 88–93 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 83–87 and accompanying text.
134. Talbott, 78 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 706–07.
135. Id. at 705.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 707.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 710 (Sills, J., concurring) (“[The Hustwits] cannot avail themselves of the
protections of limited liability corporations and at the same time claim an obligation is really
theirs.”).
141. See Dan Schechter, “Fair Value” Rule Does Not Apply to Guarantors, and Settlor of
Family Trust Can Serve as “True Guarantor” if Settlor Is Separate from Trust [Talbot v. Hustwit
(Cal. App.)], COM. FIN. NEWS., June 30, 2008, at 56 (“[T]he settlor of a family trust can serve as
a ‘true guarantor’ of the trust’s debt, if the settlor is properly separated from the trust itself.”).
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or guarantor in the transaction; and (4) the creator of the entity or the
entity itself later guaranteed the debt. Given these basic similarities,
it is a wonder that when faced with similar facts, courts have
managed to rule differently on the sham guaranty issue. The likely
reason for this disparity is a simple lack of clear law for the courts to
follow when confronted with this defense.
B. The Implications of
the Talbott v. Hustwit Ruling
On its face, the Talbott ruling is welcome relief to lenders in
California. After all, the decision can be construed to stand for the
proposition that a borrower who creates a separate entity prior to
entering a transaction should not be allowed to claim later that he and
the entity are one and the same.142 However, the implication of the
Talbott decision is not that rosy for lenders. A lender who accepts
“the clumsy structure in Talbott, in which the settlor interpose[d] an
intermediary special-purpose entity . . . as trustee, in order to create
the appearance of separation between the trust (the primary debtor)
and the settlor (as guarantor),” could still be exposed to a sham
guaranty defense.143
If the guarantor can demonstrate that the lender controlled the
structure of the transaction or that the lender looked to the
guarantor’s financial standing, as in River Bank America, a court
might still stretch to find a sham guaranty—notwithstanding the
apparent separation between the guarantor and the primary
borrower.144 Furthermore, the decision in Talbott does not constrain
the courts. Just as the court in River Bank America virtually ignored
the factual similarities with Paradise Land & Cattle Co., a different
case that happens to be factually similar to Talbott might still be
decided in a different way.
Of course, not all cases involving a sham guaranty defense are
indefensible or confusing for lenders. Cases involving a lender who,
in an effort to avoid the reach of debtor protections, forces an
individual borrower to form a corporation to serve as the primary

142. See Talbott, 78 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 706–07 (finding that the Hustwits’ creation of a trust
removed them from their status as debtors and made them true guarantors).
143. Schechter, supra note 141.
144. Id.
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borrower for the loan transaction are clear enough.145 Unfortunately,
the basic transaction structures of these cases are indistinguishable
from the conventional loans in other cases in which the facts are
distinct.146 Thus, following Paradise Land & Cattle Co., River Bank
America, and Talbott, “it is not entirely clear whether a guaranty by
an entity that wholly owns a borrowing subsidiary, even where they
have both been organized many years earlier for different purposes,
is fully enforceable following a nonjudicial foreclosure.”147
C. Courts’ Favoritism Towards Guarantors
Has Led to the Inconsistent Application
of the Sham Guaranty Defense
The guarantor has always been a favorite of the law.148 “Perhaps
as a result of a judicial preference for debtors or lawmakers’ fear of
creditor overreaching, or a combination of the two, the enactment of
statutory law . . . ha[s] betrayed a discernible deference to any party
that becomes obligated to answer for the debt of another.”149 This is
so despite the party’s initial willingness to be a secondary obligor.
Not surprisingly, the guarantors’ initial willingness tends to dissipate
when they are actually confronted with the liability they agreed to,
and they begin to assert several grand defenses—like the sham
guaranty defense.
Cases that found a sham guaranty where the lender inspected the
financial standing of the guarantor, or where the borrower initially
created an entity prior to the transaction,150 may be explained only by
concluding that “when confronted with a guarantor who elicits

145. This scenario occurs in situations where the guarantor is merely an “alter ego” of the
borrower, and therefore is entitled to the protections of the “one action rule” and the
“antideficiency rule.” David R. Krause-Leemon, Guarantors Beware, MCKENNA LONG &
ALDRIDGE LLP (Mar. 23, 2009), http://www.mckennalong.com/publications-advisories2868.html. “For example, if a lender requires a general partner to guaranty the loan of a limited
partnership, [the] guaranty could be construed as an invalid sham guaranty since, by law, the
general partner [is] already obligated for the debts of the partnership/borrower, and [is entitled to]
receive[] the protections of a borrower.” Id.
146. LEGAL OPINION LETTERS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO OPINION LETTER PRACTICE
§ 5.25, at 5–72 (M. John Sterna, Jr. ed., 3d ed. Supp. 2011).
147. Id.
148. Brian Specter, Is that Personal Guaranty Enforceable?, JENNINGS STRAUSS (Feb. 24,
2012), http://jsslaw.blogspot.com/2012/02/is-that-personal-guaranty-enforceable.html.
149. Peter A. Alces, The Efficacy of Guaranty Contracts in Sophisticated Commercial
Transactions, 61 N.C. L. REV. 655, 660 (1983).
150. See River Bank Am. v. Diller, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 790 (Ct. App. 1995).
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sympathy, the courts are willing to find numerous reasons to
abrogate the guaranty contract.”151 Unfortunately, “[t]his sentimental
deference to the plight of the guarantor has seldom been the source
of venerable legal principles.”152 As the cases have shown, the courts
are not always careful in applying these factors consistently.
Consequently, “the creditors’ only practical response
“necessarily resembles something of a shotgun approach.”153 As
lenders attempt to draft guaranty forms that can avoid various
defenses by guarantors,154 knowledge and understanding of
applicable laws are necessary to create an effective guaranty
agreement. Such knowledge and understanding is presently
nonexistent with regards to the scope of the sham guaranty defense.
Confronted with a substantial bias favoring guarantors, the “perhaps
unfortunate” creditor who relies in good faith on a loan guaranty
frequently becomes the victim of proguarantor decisions.”155
Although sound reasons exist for many of the guarantor’s defenses,
“the courts’ inconsistencies have hampered the integrity of credit
documentation” and weakened lenders’ ability to effectively look out
for their interests156—recouping remaining amounts after a
foreclosure sale recovers less than the amount loaned.
Thus, based on current law, the cases suggest that a lender’s
arguments to avoid a sham guaranty defense by a guarantor, “no
matter how reasonable, might not prevail when directed at a
guarantor favored by the court.”157
D. Lenders’ Inquiries into the Guarantor’s
Financial Status Should Not Expose Them
to a Sham Guaranty Defense
“One central and often ignored principle concerning guaranties
has remained true from the time of Solomon through the era of
structured finance—a guaranty is only as good as the guarantor.”158
In other words, a guaranty is of little use if the guarantor is not
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Alces, supra note 149, at 660.
Id.
Id. at 661.
Id.
Id. at 683.
Id.
Id. at 665.
Peterson et al., supra note 2, at 12, 18.
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financially capable of assuming the debt of the primary obligor if
they default. While some unsophisticated guarantors may garner
sympathy from the courts,159 guarantors involved in large
commercial real estate transactions are presumed to be more
sophisticated.160 They ought to understand that they are legally
bound to pay back the loan if the borrower cannot or will not pay.
“The general rule of law is that a guaranty is a separate
independent contract, and the guarantor has secondary liability after
the default of the debtor is proven.”161 Because the guaranty is a
separate contract, a lender will have to look into the financial
strength of the guarantor. The lender does this not only to ensure that
the guarantor will be able to step in and pay the debt if the primary
borrower is unable to but also to ensure that the guarantor can
enhance the credit of the primary borrower.162 But with the court’s
decision in River Bank America based in part on the fact that the
bank looked primarily at the financial standing of the guarantors,
lenders are in a difficult situation.
The reality in current real estate lending is that lenders “look
principally to the financial condition of the guarantors and other
principals of the borrower, rather than the [financial condition of the]
borrower . . . .”163 Lenders may also dictate the entity structure of the
borrower; for example, when a transaction involves nonsecuritized
loans, lenders often insist on a guaranty.164
In light of these considerations, it is not strange that some
commercial loan approval decisions are based on the financial
strength of the guarantor.165 Typically, the lending institution
159. Han Nguyen, Gauging the Personal Guaranty for Your Borrower’s Loan, LAW360
(Nov. 10,
2011),
http://www.schnader.com/files/Publication/f1e6bb31-3e3e-400f-acd2b9d8a82fc961/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/dbde5595-8359-4523-8f44c038883488be/Nguyen_Han_Guaranty_Nov%202011.pdf.
160. Douglas C. Flowers, Guarantor Waivers of the Fair Market Value Hearing, STATE BAR
OF
NEV.,
https://www.nvbar.org/sites/default/files/Guarantor%20Waivers%20of%20the%
20Fair%20Market%20Value%20Hearing.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2012).
161. GREGORY G. GARFIELD, THE STRUCTURE AND USE OF REAL ESTATE GUARANTIES AND
SURETIES 2 (Mar. 17, 2010), available at http://klehr.com/C7756B/assets/files/lawarticles/
Guaranty%20Manual%20III.pdf.
162. See Geiger & Allen, supra note 7, at 35.
163. Peter J. Gregora, Guarantees, Letters of Credit and Comfort Letters in Mortgage
Financing, in COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE FINANCING: WHAT BORROWERS AND LENDERS NEED
TO KNOW NOW 2002, at 416 (PLI Real Estate Practice, Course Handbook Ser. Nos. 478, 2002).
164. Id.
165. Tom Atkinson, Guarantor Analysis—Contingency Cash Flow, TIB TICKER (Sept. 7,
2011), http://www.mybankersbank.com/tib-ticker/archive/date/2011-09-07.
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requires information sufficient to assess the guarantor’s financial
ability to satisfy the obligation. 166 It is therefore difficult to defend
the proposition that a lender who looks too closely at the financial
strength of the guarantor in our current economy should fall prey to
the sham guaranty defense. Unfortunately, the present state of this
area of law allows and even encourages this position.
E. The Expansive Use of
the Sham Guaranty Defense
Discourages Individual Responsibility
A lender usually requires a guaranty prior to approving a loan
because it is unsure whether a borrower is capable of paying it
back.167 Under such circumstances, “the lender will not advance the
loan without the comfort of a guarantor.”168 With that being said,
most lenders advise the prospective guarantor to seek independent
legal advice regarding the transaction.169 A guarantor’s legal adviser,
assuming they are proficient in this area of law, could lay out the
different options available to the guarantor in order for them to make
an informed decision regarding the type of guaranty agreement they
are willing to sign.
There are basically three different types of guaranties available,
and they each expose the guarantor to varying degrees of liability in
the event the primary borrower defaults. The first type is called a
payment guaranty.170 Under a payment guaranty, “[t]he guarantor
typically waives notice, . . . demand for payment and any
requirement that the lender proceed against the principal obligor or
the collateral before making a claim against the guarantor.”171

166. Id. Some of the factors include “liquidity, income, debt and debt service requirements,
other cash uses, contingent liabilities, and other relevant factors including credit ratings.” Id.
167. Neil Molyneux, Signing a Guarantee Agreement? Think Twice, INT’L. L. OFF. (May 28,
2010), http://www.internationallawoffice.com/Newsletters/detail.aspx?g=5ea84a64-1cd8-4e1aafc9-308c0cdb18fc.
168. Id.
169. Personal Guarantees and the Potential Consequences of Giving Them, QFINANCE,
http://www.qfinance.com/business-strategy-checklists/personal-guarantees-and-the-potentialconsequences-of-giving-them (last visited Mar. 29, 2012).
170. Susan C. Tarnower, Trends in Commercial Real Estate Loan Guarantees, WEALTH
STRATEGIES J. (June 6, 2011), http://www.wealthstrategiesjournal.com/articles/2011/06/trendsin-commercial-real-esta.html.
171. Id.
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A second common guaranty is a limited guaranty,172 which may
be limited in several ways.173 One common way is to limit the
amount for which the guarantor is liable.174 The guarantor will then
only take on the responsibility that he or she bargained for should the
need arise.175 Finally, a third guaranty available is a nonrecourse
guaranty.176 This type of guaranty limits the liability for default to
recovery against the property, subject to a few exceptions.177
After the proper disclosures are made to the guarantors, it would
be safe to assume that they have a good sense of their obligations
under each type of guaranty. It follows, then, that for them to later
assert that they were victimized, or were unaware of the full extent of
their obligations, or were deceived, would be a mockery to individual
responsibility. Nonetheless, with the current state of the law, even a
fully informed guarantor can still assert the defense in an attempt to
avoid his or her obligation.178
Such unrestrained use of an equitable defense by savvy
guarantors must be restricted. If guarantors are free to use the sham
guaranty defense even when they are sophisticated, lenders’ abilities
to rely on guaranties will consequently be derailed. Moreover,
guarantors’ attorneys will continue to come up with more novel
factors for the courts to consider. Without any guidance or
restrictions, courts will be hard pressed not to follow their lead,
which will result in even more confusion in this area of law. Lest this
be characterized as the “parade of the horribles,” a brief look at the
history of this equitable defense shows a gradual expansion that has
led to this present chaotic state.
IV. PROPOSAL
In the current economic climate, fulfilling loan obligations and
generating new loans are of significant importance to lenders,

172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. “The guarantor will typically sign a non-recourse guarantee outlining the
circumstances under which this non-recourse loan becomes a limited or full recourse loan. The
list of triggers for guarantor’s liability [are] sometimes called ‘bad boy carve-outs.’” Id.
178. See River Bank Am. v. Diller, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 790 (Ct. App. 1995).
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borrowers, and guarantors alike.179 With borrowers defaulting on
loans, guarantors invoking the sham guaranty defense to avoid
liability, and lenders scrambling to mitigate their losses, some clarity
is necessary. Thus, it is an appropriate time for the California
Legislature to step in and clarify the scope of the sham guaranty
defense like they did with the enforceability and validity of guaranty
waivers.180
In considering the most effective way to clarify this area of the
law, it is imperative to accept that questions of whether a guaranty is
a true guaranty or a sham will inevitably involve a factual analysis.
Nonetheless, a factual analysis does not necessarily have to be
unrestrained. Therefore, the legislature should give the courts some
guidance and restrictions when considering the issue. Such guidance
will aim to provide the courts with a list of factors to consider as well
as indicate the importance of each. Finally, the legislature should set
down certain parameters as a guide for courts to adhere to when
applying these factors.
With that in mind, the legislature or other interested parties can
consider this proposal as a sample for future legislation on the sham
guaranty defense:
SECTION 2011(A): PRESUMPTION OF A SHAM GUARANTY
Absent a substantial showing of some or all of the following
factors, there is a strong presumption in favor of a true
guaranty:
1. Evidence that a lender induced a prospective borrower to
create a new entity as a prerequisite to approving a loan, and
the entity is later used as the primary borrower in place of the
original borrower who subsequently becomes the guarantor.
a) This section applies to lenders who maintain an
established policy that requires the creation of a “special
purpose entity” as a prerequisite to approving a loan,
regardless of whether the prospective borrower already
had such entity established. A “special purpose entity” is
one that is created solely for the purpose of the underlying
transaction,

179. See Rans & Williams, supra note 14, at 483.
180. See Hackett, supra note 53, at 1117–20; discussion supra Part II.A.
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b) This section applies to a lender’s continuous and
persistent suggestions directed towards a prospective
borrower to compel them to create a special purpose
entity,
c) This section does not apply to a transaction where: (1)
the primary obligor, if a form of business entity, was in
existence prior to the transaction; (2) the lender was not
instrumental in its creation; and (3) the lender does not
violate Section 2011(A)(1).
2. Evidence that the primary obligor, if a corporation, is
without any assets, thus making it a shell corporation.
Nonetheless, a corporation’s lack of substantial assets, without
additional evidence that it is a shell corporation, does not
automatically render it a shell corporation.
3. Evidence that a lender was aware of a guarantor’s naivety
regarding the implications of the guaranty, and that the lender
failed to advise the guarantor to seek independent legal
representation to conduct the transaction on their behalf.
a) A guarantor who signs a guaranty agreement is
presumed to have had knowledge and a full understanding
of the terms and consequences of the guaranty.
b) A guarantor who has previously guaranteed a loan in a
similar transaction is deemed to be knowledgeable as to
such matter and is thus estopped from invoking this
subsection.
c) The expressed opinion of the guarantor’s counsel
regarding the validity of the transaction will be considered
in evaluating the validity of said transaction.
4. Evidence of fraud on the part of the lender.

SECTION 2011(B): ADDITIONAL DISCRETIONARY FACTORS
If a guarantor fails to overcome the presumption in favor of
a true guaranty, a court may consider the following
additional factors:
1. Whether the lender directed the structure of the transaction
and the guarantor did not have independent representation.
2. Whether the guarantor is the alter ego of the borrower.
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3. Whether the lender demanded that additional collateral
owned by the guarantors be added to the transaction.
4. Whether the lender first sought to secure liens on the
guarantor’s personal property after the primary obligor
defaulted.
5. Whether the documents were ambiguous. For example,
because of carelessness, does one document indicate a person
is a borrower and another document state the person is a
guarantor? When ambiguity in the documents exists, the lender
can provide additional evidence to explain the discrepancy.
6. Whether and to what degree a guarantor is sophisticated at
the time they sign the agreement.
7. Whether the guarantor independently formed the corporation
for the purpose of procuring the loan from the lender. If so, the
guarantor is estopped from invoking this subsection. Evidence
of said purpose includes, but is not limited to:
a) Failure of the incorporator(s) to observe corporate
formalities in terms of behavior and documentation.
b) Intermingling of assets of the corporation and of the
shareholder.
c) Treatment by the incorporator(s) of the assets of
corporation as personal property.
8. Other factors that are specifically tailored to a case.

SECTION 2011(C): BALANCING CONSTRAINTS
Without limiting the force of sections 2011(A) and (B), the
courts, in applying these factors, shall abide by the
following constraints:
1. The factors in sections 2011 (A) and (B) will not, on their
own, be determinative of a sham guaranty.
2. Where the challenger of a guaranty agreement fails to
sufficiently overcome the presumption in section 2011(A), a
higher showing of factors present in section 2011(B) will be
required to overcome the presumption of a true guaranty.
3. If a guarantor fails to carry his or her burden under this rule,
but if the court determines that to find a true guaranty would be
an injustice under the totality of the circumstances, the court, in
its discretion, may invalidate the guaranty agreement in the
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interest of justice. Such balancing must be tailored specifically
to the case. A showing of injustice will not be found in the
following situations:
a) A guarantor who is already liable for other defaulted
loans;
b) A guarantor who had the opportunity to mitigate his
liability from the outset of the transaction;
c) A deep sense of sympathy for the plight of the
guarantor as a secondary obligor; or
d) A general feeling that lenders need to be punished
based on a prevailing public animosity towards them.

V. JUSTIFICATION FOR THE PROPOSAL
This proposed legislation will serve as soothing relief in a
chaotic area of law and is justified on a number of grounds. First, this
proposal provides the courts with clear law to apply whenever they
are confronted with a sham guaranty defense. Instead of considering
a variety of novel factors that guarantors and their attorneys create,
courts need only look to the law to know which factors to consider
and how to balance them in order to reach a decision that is fair to all
parties under the factual situation.
Moreover, this proposal fosters a culture of responsibility by
encouraging guarantors to be more cautious before signing
guaranties. Instead of relying on a court’s sympathy to avoid liability
on loans they voluntarily guaranteed, guarantors will be more likely
to look for ways to reduce their liability in anticipation of the
primary obligor defaulting. Even borrowers, who might ordinarily
contemplate creating a fictitious entity to get approval for a loan that
they later guaranty, will reevaluate the wisdom of their strategy in
light of this legislation.
Furthermore, this legislation will finally alleviate lenders’
confusion in this area of law. When structuring their transactions, the
proposal alerts lenders to a set of factors that might expose them to a
sham guaranty defense. This places them in a better position to avoid
falling prey to a guarantor’s sham guaranty defense, since they can
better anticipate problematic behaviors and strategies.
Additionally, the proposal addresses the potential that if given
the chance, lenders may seek to take advantage of both the borrower
and the guarantor. To mitigate this concern, the proposed legislation
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includes provisions that give courts some controlled discretion in
situations in which a creditor has clearly gone against the rule but the
guarantor is unable to prove the specific factors to establish a sham
guaranty defense. Thus, the proposal is fair to all parties involved.
Finally, this proposed legislative solution is consistent with the
policy reasons behind the California antideficiency statutes that were
designed to limit the liability of real property owners following
foreclosure.181 The proposal does not remove any protection from a
real property owner, but works to hold guarantors accountable.
The proposed legislation will be a conversation starter for the
California Legislature in its attempts to clarify this area of law. As
the economic situation continues to unfold, the effects on the
commercial real estate market may require the legislature to continue
to amend certain sections of any statute they eventually choose to
adopt. Nonetheless, this proposed solution serves as a step in the
right direction in the quest for clarity of the sham guaranty defense.
VI. CONCLUSION
Creditors serve a crucial role in our economy. “Every nation
needs a mechanism to expand its money supply, consistent with the
growth rate potential of the economy.”182 Creditors serve that
function by making loans available for economic development. They
provide much needed funds to the small business owner who seeks to
expand, the real estate developer who seeks to develop a new mall,
the multinational corporation that seeks to conduct a merger, and
many other entities. Guaranty contracts are a fundamentally
important tool to all parties in such transactions.
Such an important part of the economy should have clear laws
governing its adjudication. The law should work for all parties,
instead of treating some as villains and others as favorites. Moreover,
this is hardly the first time the courts have faced challenges in
enforcing guaranties without any law to guide them. They faced the
challenge of guaranty enforceability in the mid-1990s, and the
legislature sensibly worked to safeguard their viability by enacting a
181. The Real Estate Market, California’s Anti-Deficiency Laws and Sham Guaranty,
ROBERT M. HELLER, http://www.rhellerlaw.com/anti-deficiency-laws-sham-guaranty.html (last
visited Apr. 15, 2012).
182. In Defense of Private Banking, WFHUMMEL, http://wfhummel.cnchost.com/
privatebanking.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2012).
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law that specifically clarified the issue.183 The same should be done
here. In the current economic climate, the sham guaranty defense
issue is important, and failure to act will preserve a status quo that is
inherently unfair and seeks to punish an important sector of the
economy.

183. See discussion supra Part II.A (discussing how the California Legislature finally
clarified the enforceability and validity of guaranty waivers).

